Did The Bug Prosecutor Fabricate Evidence?

Since last week I've been examining the evidence folders of the lawsuit launched alleging that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's offices were bugged.
The indictment is based on two basic foundations. The first one is the reports of the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) and a counter-report by an associate professor who works as the primary specialist at the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB). I have already mentioned some of the contradictions regarding this aspect of the case. I am going to draw your attention to some new contradictions that I come across in my reading soon.
The second most important base of the indictment is related to the bugs reportedly found at the prime minister's office.
The prosecution and the investigators claim that the bugs were tracked down and found to have come from a factory located in Denmark. The prosecutor has also included some documents related to this claim in his indictment. Some media institutions known to be close to the state have already published some of these documents.
There are some basic discrepancies in these documents. For instance, one of the most important documents that the prosecutor bases his claims on involves suspect Enes Çiğci. When you examine the publications of the state-friendly media, you can find claims that these bugs were bought in order to be placed in Erdoğan's office.
Enes Çiğci works at the technical unit of police intelligence. He purchases the technical gadgets, aka the bugs. It seems as though Enes Çiğci bought the bugs using the official e-mail address of the Security General Directorate (EGM). The documents that the prosecutor included in the indictment prove this beyond a doubt. Moreover, according to the documents and the testimony of the anonymous witness named Hancer14, the EGM had paid for these devices using its own budget. Acting as any professional should act while ordering these bugs, Enes Çiğci used the official e-mail address of the Security General Directorate.
The prosecutor claims that Enes Çiğci and his colleagues bought these devices with the purpose of spying. Isn't it a bit weird for a spy to buy gadgets that are intended for spying with an email address that is registered to the Security General Directorate and his own institutional ID?

Indictment incoherent and baseless

This alone is adequate to show how incoherent and baseless the bug indictment is, but the charade continues. There's a more important, major scandal in the indictment.
At this point, I am going to quote a section that is the backbone of the indictment. Almost all of the documents and evidence in the indictment are referred to in this section. The text below was copied from the indictment without any changes:
“ACCORDING TO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE SECURITY GENERAL DIRECTORATE REGARDING THE SUBJECT;
It has been found that the email in question includes information and documents about the bugs that were found in the prime minister's residence and office; that the investigation performed on the sender of the e-mail, Ibrahim Hakkı Yurtsever, reveals that this person is involved in the bugging incident being investigated and the content of the e-mail shows that the denouncer is proficient in the techniques of intelligence work; that according to the personnel registry of the National Intelligence Organization [MİT], there is no past or present record of İbrahim Hakkı Yurtsever; that as stated in the e-mail, the name he used in the denunciation might be fake as he is worried about suffering negative consequences; that there are no accounts in any social media platforms that were registered to the e-mail yurtseveribrahimhakkı@yandex.com, hence it is concluded that this e-mail account was created only for use in the aforementioned denunciation; that as the IP blocks are owned by Yandex Mail, located in Russian Federation, it is not possible to determine the identity; In addition, according to the detailed examination of the documents in the e-mail;
-that there is an invoice dated Nov. 11, 2010 made out to T.C., the Security General Directorate, Department of Intelligence, Yıldız/ANKARA for one Loke III TX (mini transmitter) and one Loke II Reciever (without recorder) 420 Mhz for the purchase of a listening device, for a total sum of $37,500;
-that TNP stands for The National Police and Enes is the name of the purchaser on the pro forma invoice/purchasing order with the inscription TNP ENES, dated July 11, 2011 made out for listening devices and related apparatus LOKE II and LOKE III
- that in the phrase “TNP Enes 080910” in the quote/COBHAM with a value of 60,000 euros written on the listening devices and apparatuses of make LOKE II and LOKE III, dated 08.09.2010 and issued by the company Cobham/Spectronic, “TNP” stands for “Turkish National Police,” “Enes” is the name of the receiver and “080910” is the date of issue (08.09.2010);
- that in the phrase “TNP Enes 080910” in the quote/COBHAM with a value of 53,000 euros belonging to the listening devices and apparatuses of make OMEGA, dated 08.09.2010 and issued by the company Cobham/Spectronic, “TNP” stands for “Turkish National Police,” “Enes” is the name of the receiver and “080910” is the date of issue (08.09.2010);
- that in the phrase “TNP Enes 080910” in the email correspondence dated 12.11.2010 between "Daniel" from the company Spectronic and the intermediary company, “TNP” stands for “Turkish National Police,” “Enes” is the name of the receiver and “080910” is the date of issue (08.09.2010), and that the text from the email reading “Hi Daniel. Enes phoned as the result of their visit to Denmark,” indicates that Enes, a member of the TNP paid a visit to Denmark-based Cobham/Spectronic company;
- that in the mail correspondence dated 07.10.2010 regarding the procurement of the listening/monitoring devices (Loke 2 and Omega 2), the phrase “Enes ÇIGCI” in the phrase “From: Enes ÇIĞCI” at the beginning of the email is “Enes ÇIĞCİ” and “313620” in the phrase “31362Q@egmidb.gov.tr” is Enes ÇIĞCİ's institutional registry number at the General Directorate of Security and “egmidb.gov.tr” is the corporate mail extension of the Intelligence Department of the General Directorate of Security and that “Enes ÇIĞCİ” in the phrase “Enes ÇIĞCI Inspector TNP” at the end of the email is Enes ÇIĞCİ and “Inspector” is the English translation of the rank “Komiser” and “TNP” stands for “Turkish National Police;

'IDB' in the phrase 'IDB-Enes'

- that “IDB” in the phrase “IDB-Enes” in the beginning of the email correspondence dated 16.08.2012 and titled “Hi Daniel” and sent via Gmail stands for “Intelligence Department” and “Enes” is Inspector Enes ÇIĞCİ with a registry number of 313620 (ANNEX-8);
- that the phrase “REQUISITIONER: TNP Intelligence Department” in the document dated 12.09.2012 and issued by the Cobhan company and which contained the shipping details (sender, receiver and ordering party) of the listening device of make Loke III is the English translation of “TALEP EDEN: EGM İstihbarat Dairesi Başkanlığı”;
As examined in detail above, the phrases “TNP ENES,” “IDB-Enes” and “313620@egmidb.gov.tr” in the whistle-blowing email refer to Inspector Enes ÇIĞCİ (Turkish Republic Identification No 16051676552 and registry number 313620), who graduated from the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering of the Middle East Technical University (METU) and who worked at the head of the Technical Counterintelligence Bureau between 21.07.2009 and 01.10.2009 and who was taken into custody in investigation on 17.06.2014.
Now hold on to your hat. There is no reference to the email allegedly sent by İbrahim Hakkı Yurtsever in the above-mentioned documents that formed the backbone of the indictment. For three days I have been searching for the email that the prosecutor considers as evidence. I have talked to the lawyers and the defendants. I have made them check it as well. I have searched in every nook and cranny among the thousands of documents. But there is no sign of the email sent by İbrahim Hakkı Yurtsever.
Oddly enough, many of the documents allegedly sent to Yurtsever's email are in the evidence folders of the indictment, but the email itself is nowhere to be found.
This means that Yurtsever's email does not exist, but the prosecutor is fabricating evidence based on this nonexistent email. It could also be possible that a **ok** plot was conjured up by putting the official correspondence documents which can be found in the records of the Intelligence Department of the General Directorate of Security into the indictment with the intention of creating the perception that an offense was committed.
If the prosecutor had included this email in the indictment's evidence folder, then we would be able to check the time of the email and see if there is any chronological discrepancy. Perhaps the prosecutor didn't include it in order to conceal an obvious contradiction.
The prosecutor has to show this email to the court. If he fails to do so, all other documents referenced in that email will be legally meaningless. And this applies to the indictment as well…

EMRE USLU (Cihan/Today's Zaman)