Erdoğan, Kurds, The PKK

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has restarted its terrorist activities in Turkey, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has given up its soft language towards the PKK, moving fast to the side of Turkish nationalist voters. I have never believed that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is sincere about solving the Kurdish problem. But sincerity is not one of the primary qualities expected from a politician, and insincere people can also solve problems, if given some concrete and pragmatic incentives.
As far as I can see, Erdoğan's game plan was this: In return for the PKK's support for the establishment of an autocratic Putinistic presidential regime by altering the Constitution, Erdoğan was ready to give some political concessions to the PKK, such as administering the Kurdish-dominated regions of Turkey. He is known for his zigzags and radical U-turns, so he could easily reverse some of these decisions after he had firmly established authoritarian rule after 2015, since until 2019, there would not be any elections and he would not need the PKK's electoral support. I think the 2014 presidential elections have changed his mind.
He has seen that without the PKK's support, he received 52 percent of the vote. This meant that he did not have to give any pre-election concessions to the PKK. He is probably trying to see if his party gets more than 330 seats in Parliament, which will give him the power to take a constitutional amendment package to a referendum. Given the miserable performance of the opposition parties and Erdoğan's voters' fear of an economic crisis, the people may give him 330 plus seats.
We have seen that they are unaffected by the AKP's corruption, believing that it does not directly harm their pockets, and they do not care much about its catastrophic foreign policy. The main argument of Erdoğan's voters is this: the AKP is not performing well, but the opposition will make things worse. Given Erdoğan's dominance over the mainstream media, the opposition does not have any chance to convey its message to the masses, even if they had credible projects and alternatives.
As a result, Erdoğan will not do much to solve the Kurdish problem until the June (most probably earlier) 2015 elections. Having guessed this, the PKK has returned to its normal state and has been killing innocent people in the streets, aiming to spread fear in the country so that Erdoğan will start thinking that his party might not perform well in the elections. Thus, the PKK will get what it has been promised by Erdoğan. This is a very delicate and risky game, and, despite its extremely ineffective leader, the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) might increase its votes to the detriment and chagrin of the AKP. That is why Erdoğan has also resorted to a sort of nationalist rhetoric to prevent his nationalist voters from moving towards the MHP. But he might not fully control the game. Erdoğan's puppet prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, is more nationalist and harder on the Kurdish and PKK issues, and if Erdoğan starts losing prestige, Davutoğlu may think himself powerful enough to change the Erdoğan-PKK game and start his own version, with the terms and conditions decided by him, not Erdoğan. We will see.
I think Erdoğan has missed an opportunity as far as the Kurdish problem is concerned. He has had immense popularity. He could easily challenge and lead the nation on the Kurdish issue. Instead of obeying the polls and surveys, he could try to change the mindset of Turks by explaining to them how Kurds have been second-class citizens in this country. He could convince them that in order to prevent a division of the country, the Kurds must be given lingual and cultural rights, coupled with strong local administrations, all over Turkey that will make Turkish democracy more robust and stronger. Without bargaining these rights and arrangements with the PKK, he could easily legislate for them without making the PKK a hero in the eyes of all Kurds.
His voters do not care about his corruption, lies, insults, etc. They would not care about these changes either if he wished to stand firm behind these changes, as he stood firm behind his allegedly corrupt son, relatives and ministers. He chose not to do so. And, for his short-sighted, myopic, egoistic gains, he has betrayed the Kurds and Turkey.

İHSAN YILMAZ (Cihan/Today's Zaman)