How Is Ukraine Affecting Turkish-Russian Relations?

Turkish Airlines (THY) has announced that it will restart regularly scheduled flights from Turkey to Simferopol (Akmescit) on June 26. This announcement from THY is like a short summary of the latest stage Ankara has entered with regards to Ukraine and Crimea. In fact, Ankara's support for Moscow when it comes to the Crimea issue is now turning slowly into open support. At the same time, Ankara has not made any statements about whether or not it would participate in economic sanctions by the EU and the US against Russia, which has of course annexed Crimea. Turkey called Mustafa Abdülcemil Kırımoğlu -- the leader of the Crimean Tatar community and a supporter of Ukraine and the EU -- to Ankara, urging him to see that ties with Russia are not further strained and to encourage dialogue between all parties. But Kırımoğlu refused to bow to Ankara's demands and stuck to the path in which he believed.

But why has Ankara turned from Kiev toward Moscow? The first reason for this is the fact that US and EU policy on Ukraine has remained stuck at the level of “good intentions,” with no concrete steps being taken. In this context, Ankara believes that the decision on whether or not to open the doors of NATO and the EU to Ukraine simply came too late.

The second reason for Ankara's pivot toward Moscow and away from Kiev is that the Kiev government has forced the West (and Turkey) to make a choice between Ukraine and Russia. But the West (as well as Turkey) does not wish to see its political and economic relations with Russia upended as a result of its relations with Ukraine. Thus steps on this matter are being taken slowly, and with hesitation. The radical shift to the right by the Kiev administration, as well as the increase in political tension in Ukraine, is causing distress in Ankara.

The third reason for Ankara's shift toward Russia is that Turkey-Russia relations are experiencing a peak. Mutual trust has been established between the two leaders -- Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan -- of these two countries. Both Ankara and Moscow believe that the uprisings in Gezi and Euromaidan were organized through social media by a West that wants to see changes in leadership in Turkey, Ukraine and Russia. All of which is why Moscow and Ankara are engaged in a quiet alliance against the West on this matter. The Kremlin's approach on these issues reflects the following idea: Turkey showed it is not Ukraine by suppressing the Gezi protests and at the ballot box on March 30.

The fourth reason for Ankara's recent position on the Ukraine matter is that neither Turkey nor Russia wishes to see the two countries' increasingly developed and deep-rooted economic relationship put at risk because of Syria, Ukraine or Crimea. In this vein, there are even widespread assertions these days that Russian investments and capital in the US and the EU are now turning toward Turkey as fears grow that economic embargoes will be put into place.

The fifth reason for Ankara's position is that it felt the need for a policy change when Russia took Crimea. Ankara has shifted its priorities when it comes to Crimea from the territorial integrity of Ukraine to the strengthening of constitutional rights for the Crimean Tatars. The reasons behind Ankara's change of stance on this front include Russia's acceptance of the Tatar language as an official language in Crimea, its allowing Crimean Tatars onto the political stage in Crimea and its warm view toward the formation of an autonomous Tatar region in Crimea.

Despite Ankara's failure to accept outright the Russian annexation of Crimea, Moscow is very pleased with Turkey these days. In fact, Moscow is even more pleased with Ankara's stance than it is with that of Kazakhstan and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. Of course, Moscow is not forgetting that Ankara is a part of the West.

The Russian Foreign Ministry has advised Russian citizens, in the wake of new and increased sanctions, not to travel abroad, especially to countries that have extradition treaties with the US. Turkey is actually one of these countries, having signed an extradition treaty with the US in 1979. Of the 18 million Russian citizens who traveled abroad in 2013, 3 million visited Turkey. There are even allegations that Moscow has started to try and create reasons for Russian citizens -- who routinely travel to Turkey as well as other Mediterranean countries -- to head for Crimea in the summer of 2014. Signals that the Black Sea is slated to heat up soon are Moscow's insistence that the Montreux Convention is not being abided by, its discomfort with the presence of US warships in the Black Sea and the close approach of a Russian intelligence plane to Turkey's Black Sea coast. In the wake of the events in Crimea, Russia has begun to make its mark again as a key player in the Black Sea region. It is simply not possible that this new situation will not affect Turkey.

HASAN KANBOLAT (Cihan/Today's Zaman)