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Kurdish Opening Of Turkey

23.10.2014 12:22

The democratization process, which is also called “the Kurdish opening,” is the most daring process initiated by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. Only the AKP has carried this project beyond rhetoric. Several attempts were made in the past to tackle the problem, but it never took off. This time again, risks are looming ahead for this process to fall victim to political climate (OK??) in Turkey. One of two salient features of this political climate is the approaching general elections, and the second is the crisis that broke out in the Syrian city of Ayn al-Arab, which is called Kobani by the Kurds.The general elections were scheduled for June 2015, though recent rumors have said they might be held a little earlier. The reason given for this change is the coincidence of the election date with university admission examinations. Some observers believe that the real reason is the deteriorating economic situation. Even if this deterioration is mainly due to external

The democratization process, which is also called “the Kurdish opening,” is the most daring process initiated by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. Only the AKP has carried this project beyond rhetoric. Several attempts were made in the past to tackle the problem, but it never took off.

This time again, risks are looming ahead for this process to fall victim to political climate (OK??) in Turkey. One of two salient features of this political climate is the approaching general elections, and the second is the crisis that broke out in the Syrian city of Ayn al-Arab, which is called Kobani by the Kurds.
The general elections were scheduled for June 2015, though recent rumors have said they might be held a little earlier. The reason given for this change is the coincidence of the election date with university admission examinations. Some observers believe that the real reason is the deteriorating economic situation. Even if this deterioration is mainly due to external economic factors, voters will blame the government. Therefore, the government may be planning to hold the elections before the economic deterioration begins to sting.

The link between the early elections and the Kurdish opening is that some concrete results have to be obtained from this opening in order to expect more votes from the Kurds. Otherwise, the ruling party might lose part of its support in its grass roots, especially among nationalists, for having revealed what it intends to give the Kurds; meanwhile, the Kurdish support will not increase because the process might not deliver anything concrete for Kurds by that time.

Second, neither the international community nor some segments of the Turkish population have appreciated the Kobani policy of the Turkish government. The Kurdish opening may run aground because of this policy. While Turkey complains about the shortsightedness of the United States' policy on Kobani, its own policy has similar shortcomings.

The threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) will disappear sooner or later, but the Kurds are to stay forever in the north of Syria. Turkey would therefore do better by trying to mend its relations with the Kobani Kurds. It did not want to do so because the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is the predominant party in Kobani, is closely linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey. It looked as if Turkey was punishing the PYD for its links with the PKK while the same government is making a deal with the jailed leader of the same PKK.

Furthermore, the population of Kobani is not composed of Kurds alone, and not all Kurds are supporters of the PYD. In fact, it appears now that various factions of the Syrian opposition -- Kurds and non-Kurds alike -- are fighting in Kobani against ISIL.

Turkey could contribute to the Kurdish opening by adopting a conciliatory policy similar to the one it has adopted for the Iraqi Kurds, despite the fact that the PKK was still nestled in the Kandil Mountains in northern Iraq.
Meanwhile, the government seems to have taken on board Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the PKK. Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan and Interior Minister Efkan Ala told the media that an improvement may be considered in Öcalan's prison conditions if circumstances justify it -- meaning if Öcalan continues to be supportive of the government policy. There is another fragile component here: If Öcalan's attitude is perceived as a bigger concession than what his vassals in Kandil are prepared to accept, the democratization process may again run into difficulty because they are the ones who control the field.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan poured a little cold water in the soup by saying that every conceivable improvement has already been made, adding, “The government cannot allocate a furnished villa to him.” We will see whether Erdoğan is playing the role of bad cop or if it turns out to be a more concrete divergence.
If the government makes some adjustments in its Kobani policy, the democratization process could be floated again. Otherwise, another opportunity will be missed in easing Turkey's chronic Kurdish problem.

YAŞAR YAKIŞ (Cihan/Today's Zaman)



 
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