Syria After Erdoğan's Washington Trip

23.05.2013 09:09

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Washington served its purpose from Ankara's domestic political perspective.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Washington served its purpose from Ankara's domestic political perspective. All of the cosmetics were right. Erdoğan was royally hosted by US President Barack Obama. Although under pressure due to a number of scandals, Obama was generous with his time, and the two sides had ample opportunity to discuss key issues like Syria. From a content perspective, Obama was not willing to deliver what Erdoğan was after.



On the other hand, Erdoğan moved Turkey's position away from military removal of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to one of supporting the Geneva II process. Given the shift in mood in the international arena as well as the changing fortunes on the ground, Ankara was wise to go along with the mood in international diplomatic circles. The cost of Turkey's Syria policy has been accumulating, and, given the approaching election cycle in 2014, Erdoğan does not want any baggage from his Syria policy.



The new driver of events in Syria is Moscow. This is a rather inconvenient position, but to be fair to our readers -- this is the case. Given the Russian approach to the crisis in its early stages, I have been very critical of the Russian position. Yet, Moscow is now the place to go for influencing events in Syria. The meeting of US Secretary of State Kerry and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, as well as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's hastily arranged visit to Moscow, attested to that fact. Obama wants to strike a bargain with the Russians and, although some skepticism in major European capitals persists, everyone seems to be ready to go for another conference. There are all sorts of calculations behind a new conference, but many international observers recognize the dismal state of the opposition, the increasing dominance of radical groups within the opposition as well as the resolve of the regime to fight this out. The regime's strategy to prolong the conflict over time and exhaust the patience and tolerance of opposition backers seems to be working. Needless to say, this would never have worked unless Moscow, Tehran and Hezbollah had not extended their unwavering support for the Assad regime. That said, the Geneva II conference -- if it actually convenes -- is not going to produce miracles for the complicated situation in Syria. My guess is that Moscow wants to buy more time for Assad so that he can change the balance on the ground militarily. The regime's attack on Qusayr appears to be incomplete, but, if news of the Syrian army taking Qusayr back is true, we may see a reversal of fortunes. Add to that the fact that infighting for supremacy among the 1,400 different "brigades" battling the regime has begun. The perennial problem of acknowledgement of civilian leadership over the military wing continues. The forces on the ground continue to be unwilling to accept such authority over their actions.



A prominent political leader in Lebanon recently confided that it is likely the world will see many more Geneva conferences with little concrete outcome. Syria and Assad's fate seems to be tied to the facts at present. While Russia has come out of the Syria crisis with increased international clout, the tragedy of the Syrian people continues to plague our conscience. The real possibility that Syria might disintegrate, or a permanent state of regional chaos prevailing in the region, constitutes a critical challenge to our foreign policy. The Israeli dimension to the conflict even further sensitizes the situation. While Ankara made the right diplomatic maneuver in agreeing to the Geneva II process, the misery and risks emanating from the Syrian imbroglio are far from over.



SUAT KINIKLIOĞLU (Cihan/Today's Zaman)

In order to provide you with a better service, we position cookies on our site. Your personal data is collected and processed within the scope of KVKK and GDPR. For detailed information, you can review our Data Policy / Disclosure Text. By using our site, you agree to our use of cookies.', '