23.05.2013 09:09
Turkish foreign policy on Syria has reached an impasse.
Turkish foreign policy on Syria has reached an impasse. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Washington did not result in any promising signals that Turkey would overcome this situation in the short run. For instance, we now know that Erdoğan, who had dismissed the Geneva conference on the future of Syria as a solution to the crisis on his way to Washington, changed his mind after the visit.
Erdoğan has returned from Washington with the following conclusions.
1. We cannot make any progress on Syria if Russia is left out of the equation. Therefore, Russia has to be convinced to take constructive action, which means that Russia is the actual winner to arise out of this visit.
2- The al-Nusra Front is a red line for the US but al-Nusra is the strongest armed opposition group fighting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The US has asked Turkey to stop supporting this group through its National Intelligence Organization (MİT). This American attitude vis-à-vis al-Nusra will eventually weaken the resistance movement of the opposition groups.
3- Turkey's allegations that Assad has used chemical weapons remained unconfirmed or the US declared that it did not trust Turkish intelligence indicating they had been used. This means that the reluctance of the US to intervene in Syria has been confirmed once again.
Thus, Erdoğan's visit to Washington gave Russia a stronger hand and raised Assad's hopes for further survival.
In this case, the question that needs to be asked is whether Turkey, having failed to garner support from international actors, is strong domestically against Assad.
Unfortunately, the answer to this question is not positive. Turkey's most sensitive institution, its intelligence agency, has pro-Assad figures within it for varying reasons and these figures have been assigned to deal with issues relating to Syria and Hatay. There were media reports indicating that intelligence figures in Hatay had sold out the opposition groups. Unfortunately, there are prominent figures in Hatay occupying crucial positions who are close to Assad. The Reyhanlı incident should be evaluated from this perspective as well.
We should ask this question, then: Who provided the intelligence that the al-Nusra Front would attack US institutions in Ankara and that three bomb-laden vehicles had been prepared in Raqqa for this purpose and why? Which intelligence agency weakened Erdoğan's hand vis-à-vis Barack Obama before his visit to Washington, given that it was obvious that the US would want to discuss the al-Nusra issue?
Let me delve deeper. The Reyhanlı attackers were being wiretapped before the attack, so why weren't security units informed of their intention and why was the relevant intelligence kept a secret? Who hid the information from whom and why? Without answering these questions properly, Turkey has no chance of dealing with the Assad regime. In addition, Ankara has turned into a capital of gossip. Some strange practices are in place. Nobody cares about the crisis in Syria, the emerging problems in the country or the rise of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Everyone is busy with their own promotions and futures.
Unfortunately, this is the plain reality. Ankara is now experiencing the same political deadlock that the Ottoman state encountered during its collapse. The most visible elements in politics in Ankara are ambition, fear and hatred. Everything is a set-up in Ankara, which is currently suffering from a lack of reason and conscience. The questions are a set-up, the answers are a set-up, the intentions are a set-up and the writings are all a set-up.
In addition, Ankara is becoming even more troubled due to the approaching elections. The government, which gave huge concessions to the PKK in order to hold peaceful elections, is waking up to the Syrian reality after the bombs that exploded in Reyhanlı.
Because of this deadlock, the government agreed to all the items on PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's roadmap -- items it had dismissed in 2009 for the settlement of the Kurdish problem. Additionally, the PKK recruited more than 1,000 militants over the last few months. The overall picture is as follows: The period in which Erdoğan feels the strongest is overlapping with the period in which the government is experiencing a severe deadlock over its Syria policy. The institutions Erdoğan believed would support him stabbed him in the back in the Raqqa incident in Syria and the Reyhanlı bombings.
Because the decision-makers in Ankara are extremely ambitious about their own futures, they tend to resolve their problems by relying on power and coercion rather than reason. This causes many mistakes and the wrong steps to be taken.
And those who warn them that they are doing wrong are declared enemies.
EMRE USLU (Cihan/Today's Zaman)