The AKP Changed Its Strategy

Within a few days, the political context of Turkey changed completely.
You know of the major events we have witnessed recently, but let's briefly review them.
In Suruç, a town on the Syrian border, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) massacred a group of young people, many of whom came from the west of Turkey to express their solidarity with the Kurds of Syria who are fighting ISIL.
One day later, two Turkish police officers were assassinated. The People's Defense Forces (HPG), the armed branch of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), has taken responsibility for this crime. An armed member of ISIL opened fire on Turkish soldiers near the Syrian border, killing an officer. The army responded by bombing ISIL forces in the area, but in a rather limited fashion. Starting a war against ISIL has been an occasion for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to seize.
These days, Turkish war planes are heavily bombing PKK installations in northern Iraq. The PKK has begun to conduct armed attacks against Turkish security forces, inflicting damage. The de facto cease-fire in place has ended. As a natural consequence, this surge of violence has effectively terminated the so-called “peace process” with the PKK.
Considering these events, I think the AKP has shifted its political strategy regarding a change in the country's system of government, which constitutes its main aim. Before the general election on June 7, the AKP and its de facto leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, were claiming openly that all basic challenges Turkey faces can only be handled properly under a presidential system of government.
In other words, according to the AKP, only Erdoğan, who was elected president in a popular vote organized for the first time in August, would be capable of leading Turkey, and to do this, he would need far-reaching executive powers. As the existing parliamentary structure would not offer him these powers, the country required a particular presidential system that would grant the president the wide-ranging executive powers he demanded.
The final stage of this strategy was to hold more than 330 seats in Parliament in order to give the AKP the majority needed to hold a referendum that would open the way to change the Constitution to allow for a presidential regime. In order to get this majority, it was necessary that the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) receive an insufficient number of votes to pass the threshold of 10 percent.
The AKP was hoping to maintain two contradictory policies at once: On the one hand, it used all political and ideological means, even provocations, to attack the HDP while simultaneously preserving, at least on paper, the peace process, in order to prevent votes from its traditional Kurdish supporters from going over to the HDP. On the other hand, it used a harsh, anti-Kurdish discourse in order to prevent its Turkish nationalist voters from supporting the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
This strategy failed completely on June 7. The AKP not only failed to gain the majority it needed for a referendum, but also lost its majority in Parliament. I do not think the AKP, particularly Mr. Erdoğan, has been able to digest this failure.
I have asserted in this column that the top managers of the AKP have only announced the party's willingness to form a coalition for show, rather than serious policy. The real aim of the AKP is to organize new elections in order to win the majority to hold a referendum on its own, whatever the price may be. The war against PKK targets was clearly launched to regain votes lost to the MHP.
As for Kurdish votes lost to the HDP, I am not sure that all of them could be convinced to vote for the AKP again in the current context, but AKP managers may hope that some supporters of the Republican People's Party (CHP) who voted for the HDP during the last election might refuse to do so again, given the ambiguous relationship between this party and the PKK.
If the context of war proves insufficient to keep the HDP under the election threshold, the AKP government may still to try prevent this party from participating in new elections by simply shutting it down, claiming that it collaborates with a terrorist organization.
Let me recall once again that the AKP needs just 45 percent of the vote (it received 41 percent in June) in order to win more than 330 seats if the HDP is kept under the threshold. In order to win back an absolute majority in Parliament, 44 percent would be enough. Unfortunately, the AKP considers its new strategy worthwhile, despite the bloody cost it involves.

SEYFETTİN GÜRSEL (Cihan/Today's Zaman)