Turkey Facing New Challenges

Turkey faces new challenges because of the US initiative to set up a core coalition to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as the Islamic State (IS). One of the challenges is whether or not Turkey should join the coalition. US Secretary of State John Kerry negotiated an agreement with nine regional countries on Sept. 11 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Turkey is the only participating country that did not sign the final communiqué of the meeting, but this should not be construed as a refusal to cooperate with the coalition.
On the contrary, Turkey participated in a meeting convened for the same purpose in Paris on Sept. 14 and has already started to tighten measures to filter potential IS recruits at the border gates. However, Turkey may still be considered by the signatories of the communiqué as a “less-than-full partner” of the coalition.
There may be several reasons behind Turkey's reluctance: It may not believe that this coalition can successfully fight the IS when almost every single member has a different agenda regarding the Middle East, as demonstrated at the Paris meeting of the coalition.
Another reason may be to not put at risk the lives of 49 people taken from the Turkish Consulate General in Mosul, Iraq, who are being held hostage by the IS. Because of this real risk, no country, including the US, questions the reluctance of Turkey. However, Turkey shied away from declaring this reason publicly. This silence may give the impression that there are other reasons for disagreement between Turkey and the core coalition.
The second challenge is Turkey's position on potential cooperation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is on the terrorist list of the EU and NATO countries. Turkey is worried that the PKK's participation in the fight will increase the international recognition of the latter and that they will equip it with more sophisticated weapons. This will make the PKK more self-confident, or even more, arrogant, and will enable it to come up with additional demands in its reconciliation negotiations with the Turkish government. While it is difficult to ignore this legitimate apprehension of Turkey, it is equally difficult for the international community to turn a blind eye to the PKK's availability. It remains to be seen whether the international community will be able to take care of Turkey's sensitivity.
Another challenge that Turkey is faced with is the Syrian dimension of the fight. The US is on the record pointing out that it will not cooperate with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Despite this, there are media reports that some sort of cooperation with the Syrian regime is being voiced in NATO fora. This may not be cooperation in due form, but NATO and the Syrian regime may agree on a modus vivendi to coordinate their military operations in a manner that will cause greater damage to the IS. If a consensus emerges in NATO for such a backdoor arrangement, it will not be easy for Turkey to oppose it.
A similar challenge is the question of cooperation with Iran. Turkey believes that the involvement of Iran will foster the sectarian character of the conflict. Both Iran and the US have declared their mutual unwillingness to cooperate in the fight against the IS. Despite this, Iran is very much present in any equation related to Iraq. Therefore, the US and Iran may choose to act in alignment without calling it cooperation in due form. They may do so at the tactical level, if they have converging national interests.
The same type of tactical cooperation may also be worked out between Saudi Arabia and Iran. By forcing former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to step aside, they already demonstrated that they could cooperate. There is a strong need for Turkey to overhaul its foreign policy regarding the Middle East in general, but more specifically in Syria, Egypt, Israel and Libya. The changes that have taken place recently in Turkey's domestic political landscape were a good opportunity to adjust Turkey's foreign policy to the changing realities in the Middle East. It should not be difficult for the new, experienced team at the helm of Turkey's foreign policy to make such an adjustment at the present juncture. If this train is missed, it may be much more difficult to catch it in the next station.

YAŞAR YAKIŞ (Cihan/Today's Zaman)