Turkey's Fatal Error Of Judgment In Kobani

As I am writing this article, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) fighters have moved into the Syrian-Kurdish town of Kobani on the Turkish border. Despite fierce resistance by Kurdish militants and renewed bombing by US fighter jets on Tuesday morning, it looks like the last Kurdish holdout against ISIL in this part of Syria will soon be conquered by the jihadists. With over 10,000 civilians trapped inside the town and knowing the brutal way ISIL deals with people in areas it has occupied, many fear we are about to witness another massacre.
The Kurds are cut off from supply lines and surrounded by ISIL forces on three sides. The fourth, the Turkish border, is heavily guarded by the Turkish army. The Turks have allowed an estimated 180,000 Syrian Kurds to escape from the ISIL advance and flee to Turkey, but they have also prevented Turkish and Syrian Kurds from joining the fight. This confusing combination of offering help on the one hand, but enforcing isolation on the other, has led to anger and frustration among Kurds all over the region.
But also journalists and observers on the spot are wondering what Turkey's game plan is. Why are Turkish tanks on the Turkish side of the border not firing a single shot to stop the onslaught? The pictures of the Turkish army as a spectator and bystander, doing nothing while Kurds are being killed in front of their eyes, has created a worldwide perception of Turkey as a cynical and calculating player, dragging its feet to take on ISIL directly, even if thousands of Kurds may die as a result of that wait-and-see attitude. When Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu tells CNN, “We will do everything possible to help the people of Kobani because they are our brothers and sisters,” the harrowing reality at the border will cause many to doubt the sincerity of these words. What went wrong?
I am afraid the Turkish government made a fatal mistake by considering understandable concerns about the US-led anti-ISIL coalition as a legitimate reason to stay out of that fight at all costs. First, on the good reasons for Ankara to be critical: Turkey definitively has a point when it calls for an overall strategy that focuses not only on destroying ISIL, but it should also include plans for the eventual ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The same applies to Turkey's insistence on creating a buffer zone along the Turkish-Syrian border and the pressure on Washington to help in maintaining a no-fly zone over those areas.
As I wrote before, these are good points that should be discussed and negotiated with the Americans. At the same time, it is a fatal error of judgment to link these pertinent conditions directly to the current drama in Kobani. There is a second and similar flaw in Turkey's strategy to make its assistance to the beleaguered Kurds conditional on the main Syrian Kurdish party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), taking a clear stance against Assad and joining the mainstream rebels of the Free Syrian Army, which is supported by Turkey. Again, there are good reasons for the Turkish government to discuss these issues with the Syrian Kurds. But the decision to postpone any help in preventing a massacre in Kobani until Turkey has managed to blackmail Salih Muslim, the PYD leader, into such a deal is simply indefensible on human and political grounds.
How can you ever defend standing by while innocent people are being killed because you were not able to strike a deal with their leader yet? On top of that, does Turkey really think the PYD will be more willing to accommodate Turkish demands after thousands of Syrian Kurds have been murdered without Turkey lifting a finger? And what about the long-overdue solution Turkey is trying to find for its own Kurdish problem? Does Ankara truly believe it can keep on negotiating with the PKK as if nothing has happened in Kobani?
I am convinced the opposite is true: Only when and if Turkey comes to the rescue of the Syrian Kurds, in Kobani and elsewhere, will it be able to convince them to join the fight against Assad, respect the current borders and refrain from attacking Turkey. Likewise, a deal with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) will only materialize when Turkey shows that, as Davutoğlu suggested, Kurdish lives are as valuable as Turkish ones.

JOOST LAGENDIJK (Cihan/Today's Zaman)