Turkey's New Political Fault Line

Recent public remarks made by Bülent Arınç, and then by Hussein Çelik, made the new fault line that runs through the political scene in Turkey a bit more visible for everyone.
It was not just the problems listed by Arınç and Çelik in their words that made the true depth of this fault line apparent, but the response heard to these two figures from the palace and the pro-government media as well. Bülent Bey is right. And I am certain he feels embarrassment as he witnesses how many of his old colleagues have turned into sergeants giving marching orders to judges and prosecutors. His loudly voiced objection to -- never mind the arrest of journalist Can Dündar -- the mere fact that Dündar is even the focus of an investigation is nothing short of an uprising against the pressure placed on the Turkish press these days. And, of course, it's no coincidence now that Arinc is being attacked by pro-government “columnists” (I'm ashamed to call them “journalists,” “trolls” would be more fitting). But it's understandable why these attacks are happening now; after all, Bülent Bey stepped all over the bleeding wounds of Turkey, including the Dolmabahçe meeting, Dündar's imprisonment, the parallel paranoia and so on. He underscored a series of painful truths in doing so. And so it is that suddenly he deepened that very essential fault line dividing Turkey a little bit more.
The truth is, we'd do best to read the situation as essentially a tragedy of men like Bülent Arınç or Abdullah Gül, who helped found the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Suddenly, and perhaps unexpectedly, they find themselves fallen on to the other side of the chasm. And now they have two choices: Either they will continue, as they have until now, to remain invisible, accepting the fact that they are left out of the loop, bowing their necks to their fates and being forgotten; or, they will stake out positions of their own on the other side, pushed into opposing flanks by the ongoing polarization in this country. The outspoken words from both Bülent Bey and Hussein Çelik seemed to voice this quandary they face. The fact that as they stand up tall and straight to back their words, that they somehow seem to expect understanding from the palace, makes this quandary all the more visible for us to see.
Let's return to this fault line; it's not exactly new. What is new, though, is that it is deepening and that it has become visible now within AKP ranks. As you may know already, ever since the foundation of the republic -- and even during the last years of the Ottoman state -- our country has been guided by politics distinguished by polarized spheres, spheres divided by a fault line. The fault line could be labeled the secular-Muslim line, and it has always been the most influential fault line in Turkey. Synonymous now with the split between the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the AKP in the west, or the AKP and the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) in the east, this fault line has been used by politicians such as former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, former President Turgut Özal and current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to build their careers. But while this fault line has been crucial for the past century, it no longer seems as critical as it was in the past; it is being replaced quickly by polarization around opposing concepts of a legal state versus despotism.
In many ways, you could say that not only is this new fault line a historic opportunity for Turkey's political history, but also a gift from Erdoğan and the AKP to this country. The greatest gift given by the AKP to Turkey has been that this country has finally transcended the feelings of victimization and enmity surrounding the struggle that unfolded for years over the symbol of the headscarf. Though the pro-government media might still carry on with its rhetoric over the “oppressed AKP,” the reality is that Muslims are now in the position of being the most influential social group in Turkey thanks to the AKP. And so now, it would be complete charlatanism to try and claim any oppression or victimization of Muslims in Turkey. What this reality means is that that old fault line no longer holds the power it once did. It has eroded. It fact, it's gotten to the point that you could even say that it's secular people who are the downtrodden nowadays in Turkey.
Personally, Erdoğan's gift to the country was one that targeted the secular classes, and was made visible through the Gezi Park protests. Through Erdogan, the perceived address of authoritarianism and oppression has changed. Now it is Erdogan who represents the denial of certain social realities such as the left, the Alevis and the Kurds; this despite the fact that until not long ago, it had been the secular, civil, military elite who did so. A recent observation that “we've arrived at our red line” from one of the most strict nationalists there is, Doğu Perinçek, is not far from the truth. And, at the same time, all the “Yes, but it's not enough” leftists who had walked with Erdoğan from the beginning, or the liberals, the conservative democrats and the anti-capitalist Muslims suddenly saw the true face of Erdogan's political identity when Gezi happened. With Gezi, Erdoğan divided Turkey. And then he divided his own party with the corruption investigations and the push for a de facto presidency. The fault line has kept on getting deeper and deeper, with witch-hunts, and impounding and takeovers of private companies.
But in the end, Erdoğan has lost. There is a de facto perception of the despotism alive and working in Turkey today. The search to reclaim a state of law now provides a platform for a new political union. We are forced now to choose between de facto despotism and a state of law. It's not really a tough choice.

ALİ YURTTAGÜL [Cihan/Today's Zaman]