Turkey's Unraveling Kurdish Policy

Turkey's nation-building history in the 20th century always considered Kurdish ethnicity and nationalism as existential threats. Multiculturalism or federalism in a Turkish-Kurdish framework were dangerous propositions for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Kemalist founding fathers. As a result, assimilation became the official policy. Kurdish cultural rights were denied and brutal policies suppressing all things Kurdish became the norm from the 1920s until the late 1990s.

Turkey's Kurdish challenge always had two dimensions: internal and external. This was hardly surprising since Kurds have an ethnic presence and tribal connections in four main countries: Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The suppression of Kurds at home thus required keeping an eye on Kurdish nationalism beyond the borders, particularly in Iraq. This cross-border Kurdish connection created a predictable dynamic for Ankara: correlation. In other words, adversarial and confrontational relations with Kurds at home often dictated a similar approach to Kurds across the border. Turkey's domestic Kurdish policy correlated with its approach to Kurds across the border.

Now that Ankara's own Kurdish peace process is rapidly unraveling, this correlation will soon be tested in the context of Turkey's relations with Kurds in Iraq. One should not forget that Turkey's domestic Kurdish opening at home -- the peace process with the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) -- came at a time when Ankara's relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq reached unprecedented levels of economic cooperation. Turkey is now one of the main investors in the energy sector of Iraqi Kurdistan and a main conduit for Kurdish oil to external markets. Improving trade relations between Ankara and Arbil had political ramifications as well. Ankara became an active supporter of Kurdish autonomy against Shiite-dominated Baghdad. Massoud Barzani, the president of the KRG, became an active supporter of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Ankara's dialogue with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.

What is remarkable about this Kurdish-Turkish rapprochement in Iraq is that it happened thanks to Washington's exit from Iraq. It is no secret that the KRG wanted a permanent American military presence in Iraq, ideally with bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. When the Barack Obama administration came to power, such Kurdish hopes rapidly vanished. The Kurds were once again left alone. To the delight of Ankara, this gave Turkey the upper hand. Barzani realized that he now needed Turkey as an ally. He had to distance Arbil from the PKK, drop his maximalist territorial ambitions over Kirkuk and make pragmatic energy deals with Turkey. Following the pattern of correlation mentioned above, the peace-process between Ankara and the PKK and good relations between Ankara and Arbil went hand in hand. Most importantly, Ankara believed it was negotiating from a position of strength. After all, the PKK and Arbil had nowhere else to go. In the absence of America from the region, Turkey had the upper hand.

Today, the impact of the Syrian civil war on Iraq is rapidly changing this picture. America is now slowly coming back to the region, mainly because the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is threatening the territorial integrity of Iraq. What Turkey fails to understand is that for Washington, Iraq is much more important than Syria. Moreover, unlike in Syria, Washington can work with a ground force in Iraq. This ground force, to the dismay of Turkey, happens to be Kurdish. There is simply no alternative for Washington. Despite all the training and support it received from the US, the Iraqi army failed to defend Mosul.

Given the Shiite political supremacy in Baghdad, Sunni tribal support for ISIL is likely to continue. Under such circumstances, the Kurdish peshmerga forces of the KRG and PKK fighters are the only military forces on the ground that can counter ISIL. In the fight against ISIL, the West has no boots on the ground other than the Kurds. This means both the KRG and the PKK will receive more Western support. The US is already supporting the KRG military and coordinating efforts with the Democratic Union Party (PYD). Turks don't like to negotiate from a position of weakness and Ankara today no longer has the upper hand against the PKK and the KRG. As we are witnessing in Turkey, the peace process is unravelling. Given the correlation between domestic and external dynamics, it may not take long for relations between Ankara and Arbil to follow the same pattern.

ÖMER TAŞPINAR (Cihan/Today's Zaman)