Turks In Ukraine: A View From Ankara

In 2010, I worked with Professor Ilyas Kamalov on a book called “Turkish-Ukranian Relations.” At the time, there was very little interest in Turkey about Ukraine. The Ottoman State, by contrast, had recognized the geopolitical importance of Ukraine.
These days, Turkish people, not to mention Turkish politics and the bureaucratic elite, don't place much importance on Ukraine. In many ways, the only arenas in which people understand Ukraine's importance in Turkey are in the ranks of the armed forces, and in the business world. By extrapolation, one could say that Ukraine for Turkey only registers when it comes to “security and the economy.” When Russia invaded Crimea, however, it was inevitable that Ukraine would gain more importance for Turkey, with Ankara becoming an actor in the matter. When this occured, Ankara's perspective on Ukraine was renewed. Which is why it is that in the June 7 elections, Ukraine even made its way into the campaign platforms of the three main parties, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
In the AKP's published manifesto, here is what the ruling party had to say about Crimea: “We will continue to support and take the necessary actions to see that dialogue flourishes between Russia and Ukraine, which is important especially in terms of our sibling peoples and ancient people of Crimea, the Crimean Tatar Turks, whose security and prosperity we wish to see guaranteed.”
As for the main opposition CHP, it said: “We will remain insistent that the Tatars of Crimea -- whose occupation by Russia we do not recognize -- have rights which are protected.”
The MHP said this: “We will remain resolute in our intention to defend the rights of our sibling ethnicity members in Crimea, and to fight against attempts to destroy, assimilate, or banish them from those lands. In this, we will support attempts to reach a fair solution with Russia.”
The HDP didn't touch on Crimea in its campaign manifesto. In the meantime, Ankara does accept the de facto situation on the ground in Crimea. Within the framework of this de facto situation, it places most importance on the protection of the political rights of the Crimean Tatars.
Interestingly, Ankara is preparing to implement a sort of “Taiwan model” where Crimea is concerned. In other words, without granting political recognition, it is aiming to set up economic relations.
Within Crimea, it is not only the Crimean Tatars who are Turkic in ethnicity. One must also remember the Gagauz Turks and the Ahıska Turks in this vein. After it stood up to back the rights of the Crimean Tatars, Turkey also stood up for the Ahıska Turks in Ukraine. In fact, the AKP government decided to accept some 617 Ahıska Turk families in 2015, starting with those in the most difficult economic positions.
Both the Crimean Tatars and the Ahiska Turks are Sunni-Hanefis. Both the Crimeans and the Ahıskas have much geopolitical importance for Turkey. As for the Christian-Orthodox Gagauz Turks, they were left out of the loop after the formation of the Turkish Republic thanks to an abiding Sunni reflex.
After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Christian Orthodox identity of the Gagauz Turks became more influential than their Turkish identity as far as Ankara was concerned. In fact, the Turkish bureaucracy, as well as political parties and the Turkish public, do not seem to even be aware of the existance of the Gagauz Turks. But the reality is, the Ukrainian Gagauz population, because of their views on Russia and Turkey, are under pressure from the radical right in Ukraine these days. There are currently two Gagauz Turks foundations in the Ukraine, where Gagauz villages start from the country's borders with Moldova, heading inland from the Black Sea coastline. Notably, the Gagauz Turks speak a dialect of Turkish closest to İstanbul Turkish of any Turkish ethnic group living outside the borders of Turkey.

After the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, there was a huge influx of Gagauz into Turkey. But the Gagauz really have no support from civil society organizations, publications, or any organized ethnic lobbies within Turkey.

HASAN KANBOLAT (Cihan/Today's Zaman)