MİT report reaches court in İmamoğlu's espionage case! MI6, CIA and MOSSAD detection

MİT report reaches court in İmamoğlu's espionage case! MI6, CIA and MOSSAD detection

09.11.2026 16:31

In the case where dismissed Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, Hüseyin Gün, Necati Özkan and Merdan Yanardağ are tried on charges of “espionage,” MİT’s investigation into digital materials has reached the court. The document stated that the phone directory of defendant Hüseyin Gün contained numbers belonging to people who had served in services such as MI6, the CIA and MOSSAD. MİT assessed that Gün presented a profile with a command of intelligence methodologies.

In the espionage case being heard at the Istanbul 25th Heavy Penal Court, the result of the investigation requested by the court from the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) has been entered into the file. Among the defendants in the case is Ekrem İmamoğlu, who was removed from his post as Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality after being arrested within the scope of the “İmamoğlu profit-oriented criminal organization” case.

COURT REQUESTED ACCESS RECORDS FOR IMM SYSTEMS

The court requested an investigation from MİT to determine the IP records and security log records of users who accessed systems with the “ibb.gov.tr” extension and the senders of some emails at issue in the case. MİT’s letter included the investigation conducted regarding the email addresses and domain usernames and passwords stated to be contained in the digital data of defendant Hüseyin Gün and alleged to belong to IMM.

The letter noted that an examination was carried out on Gün’s digital materials and that an investigation was conducted into foreign nationals with whom he was in contact.

NUMBERS OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL IN THE PHONE DIRECTORY

According to MİT’s letter, telephone numbers were identified in Gün’s phone directory belonging to people who had held various positions within the UK’s Foreign Intelligence Service (MI6), a former Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence attached to the UK Ministry of Defence, a former Director-General of Defence and Intelligence, a former Chief of Defence Intelligence, and a former Commander of UK Special Forces.

It was also stated that the directory contained numbers belonging to an intelligence officer who had served within the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), an employee of a US-based intelligence company, a former analyst who had served on the US National Intelligence Council, and a former deputy head of MOSSAD responsible for foreign relations and operational cooperation.

ALLEGATION THAT HE FOUNDED A COMPANY WITH A FORMER CIA EMPLOYEE

The letter stated that Gün was also in contact with officials of companies providing cybersecurity services abroad. It was reported that Gün, together with Aaron Barr, who is known from open sources to be a former CIA employee, founded a US-based social media intelligence and cybersecurity company.

It was stated that various presentations, reports, and files concerning the 2019 local elections, election campaign management, and social media-based data analysis, which are assessed to have been prepared for submission to IMM within this company, were found.

DOCUMENTS BELONGING TO THE STRUCTURE NAMED “X81”

In MİT’s letter, it was reported that among the materials were also found presentations and documents belonging to a structure named “X81,” which was stated to have been established to influence public movements and political preferences in Turkey and to include intelligence analysts of US and UK origin. It was noted that these documents were commercial in nature and concerned the structure’s operations and digital surveillance activities.

“BEYOND A SIMPLE COMMERCIAL ACTOR”

In the assessment section of the letter, it was stated that Gün’s digital materials, the people in his phone directory, his ties to foreign intelligence personnel, and the documents he prepared were examined as a whole. MİT assessed that Gün presented a profile beyond a simple commercial actor, one with command of intelligence methodologies, and that he was involved in activities aimed at manipulating states’ political processes.

The letter included the following statements:

“As a result of the investigations, it has been seen that he has a wide network in his phone directory including individuals who have held senior positions in intelligence services such as MI6, GCHQ, CIA, and MOSSAD, who have served as ministry of defence bureaucrats, and who have worked within former special forces. It is known that such individuals who have served within Western intelligence services and armies, even if they have left public office, continue their work by carrying the experience they acquired into the private sector through private companies they have founded and civilian contact networks, and continue to meet states’ foreign policy and security needs. This situation shows that Hüseyin Gün was in direct and intense contact with persons of exactly this profile and that, in the process, he sought to penetrate political and strategic processes in Turkey through this network. When the activity methodology of defendant Gün is examined, it is assessed that he sought to establish a systematic contact network within the public and private sectors in our country, under a commercial guise, through companies he founded or was a partner in, using the technical experience he acquired from persons who had served in foreign intelligence services. It has also been seen that Gün had command of professional intelligence methodology, based on matters such as his use of encrypted communication applications and coded and encrypted expressions.”

“CONSISTENT WITH THE FINDINGS IN THE INDICTMENT”

In the letter, when the examinations carried out on the indictment and documents and Gün’s contacts were considered together, it was assessed that the findings in the indictment and the assessments regarding these findings were consistent with MİT’s findings.

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