Ruling AKP Rests On Changing Religious Identity

Many have noted that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) was "very lucky" in many respects.
Some argued that its economic success was attributable to fluctuations in the global economy. Others suggested that the demands for greater rights by social groups that had been victimized for many years in the past played into the hands of the AKP. But the ineffectiveness of the opposition parties was claimed as the most important factor in the ruling party's success. The lack of any strong challenge to the ruling party really contributed to the ruling party's success. The main opposition party not only failed to offer a vision for the future but also revived concerns that its election strategy might destabilize the country.

However, the real advantage for the AKP is the ongoing change in society. It has such a character that the ruling party can now see itself as the creator of the national identity and declare every obstacle to not be "national." We are left with a conservatism that is secularizing and individualizing. With its hegemonic power, the AKP represents this changing conservative identity. And yet, this underlying transformation cannot be controlled by the ruling party. The AKP has to adapt or it will not be able to secure a share of the vote close to 50 percent. On the other hand, the party controls everything in the political sphere and at times sees increased authoritarianism as an easy escape. At this point, however, it is faced with a dilemma: The conservative groups favor a growth in the sphere of freedoms and integration with the globalized world. In short, they don't like authoritarianism. This dilemma is insurmountable only when there is merely a non-political threat to the AKP. Indeed, there was such a threat at the last polls and conservative voters continued to support the AKP although they didn't approve of corruption.

What is critical and more advantageous for the AKP is that these social groups are growing and forming the party's voter bank. It is wrong to compare the results of the latest elections with those of the previous elections, as the parties' bases have changed sociologically during this time. For instance, the maximum vote the AKP can secure has gradually increased.

At the root of this is the social change that flourished in the 1990s. From a conservative perspective, religiosity is increasingly perceived as an individual choice and identity. Instead of pursuing religious lifestyles with guidance from a spiritual leader, people started to emphasize a religiosity that corresponds to their own lifestyles and beliefs. On the other hand, they don't leave their religious communities; instead, they diversify and expand these communities. The result is a new form of religiosity that is pluralized and has internalized communal tolerance. This makes the boundaries of conservative groups more flexible, endowing them with a greater permeability that facilitates participation and difference. From a sociological perspective, this means that secular groups are "invited" to participate in conservative groups. And this invitation is answered. Today, there are numerous "new religious" people, including those who fast for a few days during Ramadan, pray once a day or try to create a spiritual world by blending religious doctrines with popular Sufi teachings. Now some families can be described as both "secular" and "religious." This hybridization further expands the limits of conservatism.

The result is social dynamics that run counter to political polarization. And the AKP appeals to these groups and keeps its thumb on their pulse. Therefore, it is not surprising that the AKP wins every election by a landslide.

ETYEN MAHÇUPYAN (Cihan/Today's Zaman)