Conjectural Democracy, Or The Limits Of Turkey's Democracy

My generation is fed up with the democratization debate in Turkey. I cannot remember a week passing in which we did not discuss Turkey's democratization. Today, we are talking again of Turkey's democracy that does not exist. Ironically, as of 2014, the NGO Freedom House declared that Turkey is a “not free” country. It is time to be realistic. In other words, it is time to rid ourselves of our illusions about Turkey. So, here are some hard facts that can help us be more realistic about Turkey and Turkish democracy:
Firstly, democracy is not a simple idea. It requires certain material and non-material conditions (such as a free market, a certain income level, a certain level of social capital, etc.). Unfortunately, Turkey does not have many of these conditions. Therefore, the consolidation of democracy in Turkey in the near future is sociologically, economically and politically a naive idea. Turkey does not have the social and other “capitals” to construct an efficient democracy.
Those who disagree and would criticize me for being Orientalist for this view should compare, on various indicators, the democratic performance of Turkey and advanced democratic nations. My critics are free to analyze indicators such as per capita income, or the number of books in university libraries.
Secondly, lacking the needed material and non-material prerequisites of democracy, Turkey can sustain only a conjectural democratization. What is “conjectural democracy”? Although they are not the needed prerequisites of democracy, certain conjectural dynamics may force countries in the direction of democratization. However, that will make them like a building without a foundation. For example, many states have enacted certain laws that pursue democratization just to secure American financial aid. Such conjectural democratizations are of course temporary, and more like illusions than actual social structures.
What we experienced in Turkey between 2002 and 2009 was a conjectural and illusionary democratization. The Islamists were forced to play the democracy card in order to defeat Kemalism. In other words, those brilliant years of democratic reforms were not the products of any complex, grassroots, social-and-political dynamic. There is a simple rule that governs conjectural democracies: Since they have no foundation, the dynamics that create them disappear, and with them, those conjectural democracies themselves.
As of 2014, political dynamics in Turkey have changed. So has our conjectural democracy. There is no European Union factor present now. There are no Islamists at home who need the EU card to survive. Thus, we are now in a process of normalization. In other words, the brilliant days of democratic reforms between 2002 and 2009 were abnormal in Turkey's politics and sociology. The natural condition for Turkey is to be an authoritarian (or “semi-democratic,” if you will) country.
I think the most logical behavior is to internalize a simple fact: Turkey still needs many years to become a Europe-like (or Canada-like) democracy. What happened between 2002 and 2009 should not mislead us. That was not a normal period. One should not forget that false expectations only distress us.
Can we expect another period of conjectural democracy in Turkey? Why not? Turkish foreign policy is a mess. The economy is not perfect. If we look back over the cycles of Turkish history, we can surmise that Turkey may again need the support of the international system. Most recently, Turkey's chief European negotiator, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, was appointed the new minister of foreign affairs. This is telling. There are many ardent Islamists who, with other Muslims in the Turkish Parliament, want to create a Turkish empire. But none of them was picked for that post. Çavuşoğlu's appointment gives out strong signals about Turkey's feelings of insecurity in the global system.

GÖKHAN BACIK (Cihan/Today's Zaman)