20.08.2026 13:21
Prof. Dr. Toğrul İsmayıl, who analyzes the effects of the Russia-Ukraine War on the Black Sea, states that commercial ships have become targets and that Turkey, as a diplomatic architect, could establish a new security corridor.
The latest stage the Russia-Ukraine War has reached in the Black Sea can no longer be read solely as a struggle between the naval forces of the two countries. The increasing risk to commercial ships, ports, energy facilities, and maritime transport shows that the economic and geopolitical impacts of the war have extended far beyond the Black Sea. The question to be asked today is not only "Who is striking ships in the Black Sea?" The more important question is this: Is the Black Sea turning into a new front of the war?
CIVILIAN SHIPS ARE ALSO BECOMING TARGETS IN THE BLACK SEA
Russia and Ukraine are at the center of recent developments. However, the strategic objectives of the two sides at sea are not the same. Ukraine is trying to weaken Russia's Black Sea Fleet, its energy infrastructure, and its logistics activities carried out by sea. Russia, on the other hand, aims to break Kyiv's economic resilience by targeting Ukraine's ports, grain terminals, and export capacity via sea.
Therefore, it would not be correct to evaluate every attack on commercial ships in the same category. In some incidents, claims that ships were directly targeted come to the fore, while others emerge as a result of attacks on ports or surrounding military and economic infrastructure. However, all these developments have a common outcome: civilian maritime transport in the Black Sea is increasingly becoming one of the elements directly affected by the war, rather than indirectly.
This is no coincidence. The modern character of wars is changing. Cutting off the enemy's economic lifelines is becoming as much a strategic goal as achieving military superiority on the front line. The Black Sea is an extremely suitable area for this. Because the Black Sea is not only a security basin; it is also a strategic economic area where grain, energy, raw materials, and trade routes intersect.
Consequently, the striking of a port does not only produce a military result. The risk to a merchant ship does not only concern the safety of that ship. Insurance costs rise, freight prices increase, routes change, and global supply chains are affected by this. Any security crisis in the Black Sea can quickly create economic consequences across a wide geography extending from Europe to the Middle East and Africa.
The real danger here is the increasingly blurred line between military targets and commercial activities. In a war environment where unmanned naval vehicles, long-range missiles, and various surveillance technologies are widely used, the possibility of commercial ships being targeted, even accidentally, or of attacks directly affecting commercial maritime transport is steadily increasing.
IS A SECURITY CORRIDOR POSSIBLE IN THE BLACK SEA?
At this point, the idea of establishing a safe maritime corridor in the Black Sea is gaining importance again. But the critical question here is: Who will protect this corridor?
It is not realistic or rational for Türkiye to be the sole military security provider. Türkiye assuming such a role could bring the risk of making Türkiye one of the de facto parties to the war. In contrast, a multilateral mechanism, led by Türkiye and involving Russia and Ukraine as well as the United Nations (UN), stands out as a more feasible option.
In fact, there was a precedent for this in the past. The Black Sea Grain Initiative, established in 2022 through the initiatives of Türkiye and the UN, showed that two sides fighting each other could agree, albeit to a limited extent, on a joint maritime mechanism. The Joint Coordination Centre established in Istanbul put forward an important model that regulated the movement of commercial ships by taking into account the security concerns of the parties.
What is needed today is a more advanced version of this model with a stronger security dimension. A new Black Sea security corridor should primarily be based on a mutual non-aggression commitment by the parties. Routes should be predetermined, the movements of commercial ships should be monitored through a common system, technical coordination on mines and maritime security should be ensured, and an international inspection mechanism should be established to detect possible violations.
TÜRKİYE'S ROLE
Türkiye's role gains particular importance here. Türkiye is one of the few actors that can talk to both Russia and Ukraine simultaneously. Its responsibility over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits under the Montreux Convention also gives Ankara a distinct strategic weight regarding the security of the Black Sea.
Therefore, rather than defining Türkiye's role as the "military guarantor of the corridor," it would be more accurate to see Türkiye as the diplomatic architect of a new security architecture in the Black Sea.
However, for this to happen, Moscow and Kyiv also need to make a significant political decision. Because establishing a technical security mechanism is easy. The real challenge is persuading the parties that this mechanism will not be used against their interests. In other words, the biggest obstacle to a safe corridor in the Black Sea is not technology, but lack of trust.
Therefore, the new mechanism should rely not on one party trusting the other, but on ensuring that no party can exploit the system for its own military purposes. UN oversight, Türkiye's facilitation, and mutual commitments by the parties could form a complementary structure in this regard.
Commercial ships becoming targets in the Black Sea once again demonstrates that the war is no longer a matter concerning only Ukraine and Russia. A larger maritime security crisis in the Black Sea could affect energy, food, trade, and transportation security simultaneously.
Therefore, the issue is no longer just finding an answer to the question "Who is striking the ships?" The real issue is whether the Black Sea will become an expanding front of the war or a basin that the parties can transform back into a safe trade area through controlled diplomacy.
Türkiye's strategic goal also emerges here: not to take sides in the Black Sea, but to establish the diplomatic ground that can transform the Black Sea back into a predictable and safe maritime area. Ankara's real strength lies precisely here.
*Prof. Dr. Toğrul İsmayıl is a faculty member at Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and International Relations.