18.10.2025 17:15
What happened in the plane crash in Saudi Arabia in 1980 that resulted in the deaths of 301 people? The fire that broke out on the aircraft turned into a disaster due to the crew's mistakes. Most of the passengers' bodies were found burned or completely turned to ash in the front part of the cabin. Here are some incredible details about the tragedy known as "Flight 163," which is still taught in aviation academies around the world.
It was Tuesday, August 19, 1980. The modern American passenger plane of the time, the Lockheed TriStar, took off in the afternoon. Initially, everything was going well, but no one could have imagined that the journey would end in one of the worst disasters in aviation history. By the time the plane landed, all 301 passengers had lost their lives.
The plane was heading from Karachi to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It had also made a brief stop in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. The flight, which took off from Karachi with 82 passengers and 14 crew members, had 205 more passengers board in Riyadh. Among the passengers were 82 Saudis, 80 Pakistanis, 32 Iranians, and 23 Yemenis. Among the 301 people on board were also individuals from other nationalities, including the USA, Canada, and the UK.
Saudi Arabian Airlines was one of the leading companies in the world at that time. The oil-rich kingdom had allocated significant resources to its national airline.
SMOKE ALARM SOUNDED
The plane performed normally during the flight from Karachi to Riyadh, which lasted approximately two hours and 34 minutes. However, about seven minutes after taking off from Riyadh, at 18:08, a smoke alarm sounded in the rear cargo compartment known as "C-3."
ILLEGAL GAS STOVES SMUGGLED ON BOARD
At that time, Edward Douglas Dreyfus, an American aviation expert and flight safety specialist working for Saudi Arabian Airlines, presented the accident investigation report to Sheikh Nasser Al-Assaf, the President of the Saudi Civil Aviation Authority, on January 16, 1982. According to the report, the exact cause of the fire could not be determined, but two gas stoves were found in the wreckage, which were likely brought on board by those going for Umrah to cook food.
The report stated: "These items [stoves] were legally prohibited, but either the security checks were insufficient, or the stoves were hidden among the luggage. They were neither scanned nor detected by customs officers during the manual search."
According to the report, 10 liters of cooking oil were also among the prohibited items on the plane.
Dreyfus's report noted that fire, smoke detection, and suppression systems were installed in various sections of the aircraft.
FLAMES SPREAD BEYOND THE CARGO COMPARTMENT
The cargo compartments of the aircraft were categorized based on their characteristics. The Class D compartment was designed to allow the fire to extinguish itself. A fire-resistant lining was also placed in this compartment. However, there was a serious flaw in this design. This compartment was very large and therefore contained a lot of oxygen. As a result, the fire-resistant layer burned quickly, and the flames spread beyond the cargo compartment.
Previously, there was a belief in the aviation industry that these "linings" were completely fireproof, but this accident showed that this was not the case. Smoke quickly enveloped the section where the passengers were seated.
FLIGHT CREW'S TRAINING RECORDS WERE TROUBLESOME
The Dreyfus report revealed that the pilot of the aircraft, Mohammad Ali Khowayter, had a concerning training record and was a slow learner, taking longer than other pilots to acquire the skills necessary to fly a new aircraft.
Similarly, the 26-year-old co-pilot Samih Hassanein had just received his license to fly TriStar aircraft only 11 days before the accident, and his previous training record was also unsatisfactory. He had even been removed from the program at the beginning of his training.
The third member of the flight crew, flight engineer Bradley Curtis, also had a poor record. The 42-year-old engineer was the most senior among the three but had also failed several times in TriStar flight training exams. He had recently been diagnosed with dyslexia, which made it difficult for him to read and understand flight instruments. He was fired for not completing his training on time but later paid for his training out of pocket and returned to work.
The three of them had a total of 670 hours of flight experience on this model aircraft, and all were classified as weak pilots in training records.
LACK OF COMMUNICATION AMONG PILOTS
According to the report, there was a serious lack of communication and consultation among the three individuals in the cockpit. For example, at one point, the Saudi captain referred to the American engineer as "Donkey."
Experts believe that the crew members coming from different cultures and languages made it unlikely for them to function as an ideal team in such a critical situation.
FIRE ON BOARD
According to the report, first one smoke alarm and then another began to send warning signals. The pilot initially thought the alarms were faulty and continued the flight. At this point, the flight engineer got up from his seat and went to the cargo area to confirm the presence of the fire and dense smoke, then returned to report that the fire was ongoing.
THE ROUTE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DIVERTED TO THE NEAREST AIRPORT
Upon hearing this news, the pilot decided to abandon the plan to continue to Jeddah and opted to return to Riyadh. According to the report, regulations required the pilot to divert the aircraft's route to the nearest airport as soon as the smoke alarm sounded. However, there was a significant delay in making this decision, which took about five minutes. During this time, the pilot, co-pilot, and flight engineer engaged in unnecessary conversations.
WHAT DID THE PILOT DO IN THE COCKPIT?
Famous aviation writer Admiral Cloudberg published his own investigation into the incident on Medium. He wrote that the cabin crew performed poorly in coordinating and managing teamwork.
In fact, flight engineer Bradley Curtis had made several useful suggestions, but these were ignored by pilot Mohammad Ali Khowayter. Co-pilot Samih Hassanein mostly spoke only when directly instructed by the pilot.
Among the three, Bradley Curtis was the most aware of the seriousness of the situation. However, experts say that the pilot's referring to him as "Donkey" indicated that he was not taking Curtis's suggestions into account.
ANOTHER GRAVE ALLEGATION
American contractor Michael Busby, who lived near Riyadh airport and witnessed the incident, claimed in a 2010 article that the delay in the emergency evacuation of flight 163 was due to the Boeing 747 belonging to the King of Saudi Arabia, which was ready for takeoff at the same time. According to Busby, protocol required that all flights be halted when the King's aircraft took off.
```html
The crew of flight 163 may have feared that if they immediately evacuated the 300 passengers on the runway, they would obstruct the King's flight and face severe penalties. This claim was never verified.
DOORS WERE OPENED IN 29 MINUTES
The aircraft successfully landed at 18:36, but it was reported that the pilot did not apply the emergency brake (maximum braking force), which caused the aircraft to continue moving on the runway for more than two minutes despite the hydraulic pressure functioning properly.
If the emergency brake had been applied, the aircraft would have stopped on the runway about two minutes earlier, and nearby rescue personnel would have been able to access the aircraft immediately. The next step was to open the aircraft's doors, but this process also took six minutes.
When firefighters and rescue teams finally reached the aircraft's doors, they were locked, and most of the rescue team did not have the training to open the TriStar's doors or the tools to activate the mechanism.
Because the pilot did not shut down the engines immediately after landing, the rescue team could not open the aircraft's doors in time. The door handle had not been pulled from the inside, as the sudden fire and toxic smoke had likely incapacitated the cabin crew.
BODIES OF PASSENGERS WERE FOUND AT THE FRONT OF THE CABIN
This delay wasted critical minutes and eliminated the chance for passengers and crew to escape. During this time, carbon monoxide completely filled the cabin, while the temperature inside the cabin also rose to abnormally high levels due to the flames. When the doors were opened, everything was gone, and most of the passengers' bodies were found at the front of the cabin, where they had gathered to escape the smoke, burned or completely turned to ash.
Just as firefighters had entered the aircraft, a sudden flame explosion melted and collapsed the aircraft's metal roof, forcing the firefighters to retreat.
WAS THERE A FAULT IN THE AIRCRAFT?
When the Lockheed L-1011 TriStar first flew in 1972, it was considered the most advanced and safest passenger aircraft of its time. The large, three-engine aircraft was known for its advanced technology and unique features, including an automatic flight control system, modern navigation equipment, and a relatively comfortable cabin design. It had features that were later copied by other aircraft manufacturers.
Saudi Arabian Airlines had particularly added the aircraft to its fleet for long-haul flights, but it was also used on some domestic routes. The crash of flight 163 raised questions about whether there was a fundamental flaw in the aircraft's design.
According to Douglas Dreyfuss, the main issue was not the aircraft's technology but the design of the fire protection system and the crew's poor decisions. The aircraft's cargo compartment was designed as a "Class D" compartment under the assumption that the fire would extinguish itself due to a lack of oxygen, but the fire spread, and the fire-retardant lining did not work.
The official investigation did not include statements from the victims' families, but the fire truck driver described the incident as follows: "Thick white smoke was coming from the back of the aircraft, and the rescue team could not open the doors despite repeated attempts because the engines were not shut down."
HUMAN AND MANAGEMENT ERRORS TURNED THE ACCIDENT INTO A DISASTER
Douglas Dreyfuss's investigation report clearly showed that countless lives could have been saved if faster decisions had been made and appropriate training had been provided. The accident was technically classified as a "preventable" accident, but human and management errors turned the accident into a complete disaster.
The crew's delayed decision-making, negligence in emergency evacuation, inadequate training, and the absence of fire safety systems on the aircraft cost the lives of all 301 people on board, despite the aircraft landing safely.
The disaster in Saudi Arabia led to a significant review of aviation safety regulations and protocols worldwide. It ensured the implementation of measures such as improvements in fire detection and suppression systems, crew training in emergencies, rapid evacuation procedures, and effective communication between the flight crew and ground personnel.
TAUGHT IN AVIATION ACADEMIES
The "Flight 163" accident is still taught in aviation academies around the world. It also demonstrates that the real guarantee of safety in air travel is not only technical expertise but also timely decision-making, rapid intervention, and effective coordination.
```